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Note: Minnesota's Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act-
An Experiment in Tax Base Sharing
The problem of fiscal disparities within a metropolitan area'
is essentially one of inequalities in the taxable resources available
to each of the various political subdivisions that compose the
metropolis. It is a problem of relatively recent development. At
one time, the taxable resources of most central cities were more
or less balanced, consisting of commerce and industry as well
as the residences of people of varying income levels. Although
these various land uses were generally concentrated in different
neighborhoods, the city itself was large enough to contain them
all and thus to allow the rich areas to subsidize the poorer ones.
After development reached the borders of the central city, how-
ever, growth began to occur within political subdivisions in the
surrounding countryside-suburban municipalities which were
generally smaller and more homogeneous than the central city,
and which tended to be either rich or poor in terms of taxable
resources. At the same time, the central city came to shelter
an increasing proportion of the less-advantaged while it lost both
industry and residences of the more affluent to the suburbs. In
short, the sharing of taxable resources that once was possible
within the confines of the central city has today become impos-
sible because of the increasing political fragmentation of the
metropolis. 2 This in turn has given rise to one aspect of today's
much decried urban fiscal crisis.
The Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act3 represents Minne-
1. Many terms used in this Note to denote a community or politi-
cal subdivision will be used in a narrow, technical fashion. "Metropolis"
or "metropolitan area" will be used to mean the overall seven-county
area to which the Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act applies. See note
4 infra. Within this area are "governmental units" and "municipalities,"
both of which are defined by the Act. "'Governmental unit' means a
county, city, town, school district, or other taxing unit or body which
levies ad valorem taxes in whole or in part within the [seven-county]
area." MNN. STAT. § 473F.02 (5) (1974). A governmental unit is thus
a taxing body. "'Municipality' means a city, town, or township located
in whole or part within the [seven-county] area." Id. § 473F.02 (8).
See also notes 42-43 infra and accompanying text.
2. See U.S. ADvisoRY Coan'eN ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
URBANx AmERICA AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEm 9-13 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as URBAN AmERIcA].
3. MNN. STAT. ch. 473F (1974).
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sota's attempt to partially alleviate the financial imbalance
among certain of its metropolitan municipalities. The Act ap-
plies to a seven-county area that includes the central cities of
St. Paul and Minneapolis and their suburbs.4 Under the Fiscal
Disparities Act, all local governmental units in this seven-county
area share a portion of the growth in the area's commercial-
industrial 5 tax base. It is the purpose of this Note to investi-
gate the workings and constitutionality of the Act, as well as
to critically analyze the effect of the Act on the provision of pub-
lic services0 and the development of the seven-county area.
7
I. THE PROBLEM OF FISCAL DISPARITIES
A "fiscal disparity" exists between two or more governmen-
tal units when they have unequal abilities to generate revenue.
Since local governments in Minnesota generate their revenues
primarily through an ad valorem tax upon real property,8 the
4. The Act applies to the seven counties of Anoka, Carver, Dakota,
Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott, and Washington, which cover almost 3000
square miles and contain approximately two million people. Within this
area lies a diverse sampling of municipalities, including central cities,
balanced cities, dormitory suburbs, and commercial-industrial areas. See
J. MAnEoGLs, W. HELLER & N. GLICKMAN, MmOPOLITAN FIscAL DIsPAR-
ITIES: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 5-1 to 5-5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
MARaoias]. The various and oftentimes overlapping political subdivi-
sions include 137 cities, 52 townships, 49 school districts, 7 counties, and
numerous special purpose governmental units.
5. "Commercial-industrial property" is defined in MINN. STAT. §
473F.02 (3) (1974). Basically, it is property which is either used or zoned
for any commercial or industrial purpose. Apartment buildings, how-
ever, are not included. Id. § 473F.02 (3) (d).
6. The term "public services" will be used to denote those services
that local governmental units normally provide, such as fire and police
protection, water and sewer service, and education.
7. This Note will not, however, discuss the portions of the Act that
provide for a municipal equity account. Those provisions establish a
formula whereby funds appropriated pursuant to other state legislation
may be distributed to municipalities in the seven-county area. See
MINN. STAT. §§ 473F.01(7), .02(9), (11), (16)-(20), .12, .13 (1974). But
the provisions for this account are essentially unrelated to the rest of
the Act.
8. See MNNESOTA LEGISLATURE SUBcomm. ON FISCAL DIsPARrm s OF
HouSE Commsr. oN METROPOLiTAN AND URBAN AFFAIRS, FINAL REPORT, 1969-
70 INmERmW 1-2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. In recent
years, the Minnesota legislature has attempted to partially relieve both
citizens and local governments from the burdens of local property taxes
by using state income tax revenues as a source for increased state aid
to school districts and local governments. See MINN. STAT. § 124.212
(1974); id. § 477A.01 et seq. The governor's proposals for the 1975-77
budget indicate that this form of state aid will continue to increase. See
Minneapolis Tribune, Jan. 17, 1975, § B, at 10, cols. 3-4. As to the
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taxable resources available to these governmental units are
heavily dependent on the assessed valuation of the real property
located within their borders. As indicated earlier,9 however,
political fragmentation of a metropolitan area results in the
area's property tax base being divided rather arbitrarily among
the various governmental units.10 Fiscal disparities may thus
arise when the per capita assessed valuation of real property dif-
fers between two of these governmental units; a unit with a high
fiscal capacity" can tax itself at a low rate and still generate
the same revenue per capita that a poorer municipality will gen-
erate with a high tax rate.12 This situation has had two major
effects: inequities in the provision of public services, and im-
efficacy of this form of state aid in providing relief to local governmental
units, see note 125 infra.
9. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
10. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
53-54 (1973). In addition, local political subdivisions do not necessarily
correspond to the areas benefiting from the public services that a particu-
lar governmental unit provides. See note 19 infra.
11. "Fiscal capacity is a quantitative measure intended to reflect
the resources which a taxing jurisdiction can tax to raise revenue for
public purposes." U.S. ADvisoay COMM'N ON INTERGOVRN TAL RELA-
TIONS, M.EAsuREs or STATE AND LOCAL FscAL CAPACTY AND TAX EFFORT
3 (1962) [hereinafter cited as MEASURES]. The Act defines a municipal-
ity's fiscal capacity to be the market value of all real property within
its jurisdiction divided by its population. MINN. STAT. § 473F.02(13),
(14) (1974).
The fact that two municipalities have equal fiscal capacities, how-
ever, does not necessarily mean that they will provide the same level
of public services. There are many factors besides the total available
resources that affect the ability and inclination of taxpayers to seek a
particular level of services from their local government; these factors in-
clude other demands which may be made upon the available resources,
the taxpayers' perception of the fairness and reasonableness of the tax,
the taxpayers' preference for public services, the nature of the local deci-
sionmaking process, and the composition of the local tax base and popu-
lation. See MARGOLIS, supra note 4, at 3-1 to 3-3; MEAsuREs, supra;
Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On
Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303, 1315 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as A Statistical Analysis]. Differences in the per capita
costs of public services will also affect the level of the services that a
governmental unit can provide. See note 112 infra.The fiscal capacity of a municipality within the seven-county area
and the assessed valuation of its commercial-industrial property appear
to be directly related. Brief for Appellants at 25-26, Add-31, Village
of Burnsville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1974), appeal dis-
missed, 420 U.S. 916 (1975). See also MARGOias, supra note 4, at 5-6
to 5-7 (noting that the central cities may be the one exception to this
relationship).
12. Brief for Appellants at 23-28, Add-31, Village of Burnsville
v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S.
916 (1975); URBAN AME aCA, supra note 2, at 7-13.
1975]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
balance in the development of the seven-county metropolitan
area.
It is apparent that in the seven-county area there is a direct
relationship between a municipality's fiscal capacity and its per
capita expenditures for public services.'3 Significant differences
in fiscal capacity,1 4 however, cannot be readily compensated for
by increases in the tax rates of the poorer municipalities.15 Thus,
a preference for a certain level of public services within a munic-
ipality will not always control; relative wealth must also be con-
sidered. If the position is accepted that equal tax efforts should
result in commensurate yields to the taxing units, inequities in
either the public services provided or the tax burdens borne are
manifestly unfair.16
The resulting unfairness to the taxpayer becomes even more
apparent when it is recognized that the more or less arbitrary
13. See Brief for Apiellants at 26-28. Add-31, Village of Burns-
ville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed, 420
US. 916 (1975); METROPOLITAN COUNcIL, THE IMPACT OF FISCAL DIsPARITY
ON METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITIES AND SCHOOL DIsTRIcTs 15 (1971)
rhereinafter cited as METROPOLITAN COUNCIL]. See generally Netzer,
Federal, State, and Local Finance in a Metropolitan Context, in IsSUES
n URBAN EcONO1Wcs 435, 4-42 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Netzer].
Cf. A Statistical Analysis, supra note 11, at 1329.
14. In the seven-county area, fiscal capacity may vary between
municipalities by a ratio of as much as three to one. See Brief for An-
vellants at 22, Add-31, Village of Burnsville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d
523 (Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 (1975); HousE REPORT,
sunra note 8, at 1. Cf. CrrIzENs LEAGUE FISCAL DISPARITES Comm.,
BREAKING THE TYRANNY OF THE LOCAL PROPERTY TAX 8 (1969) [herein-
after cited as CITIZENs LEAGUE].
15. A governmental unit may encounter legal restraints on the tax
levy it can set, because the Minnesota legislature, in an effort to provide
property tax relief, has placed significant limitations on such levies.
MiNN. STAT. § 275.125 (1974) (school districts); id. §§ 275.50-.59 (coun-
ties, cities, and towns). If a statutory limit is exceeded, the govern-
mental unit will lose state funds. See id. §§ 275.125(4), .51(4). The
limit, however, may be increased by a referendum within the govern-
mental unit. Id. §§ 275.125 (2a) (3), .58.
Regardless of statutory limitations, a substantial increase in the tax
rate is almost always an unpopular political course. Even if politically
feasible, this course of action may prove ineffective-if the increased tax
burdens are greater than anticipated relocation costs, the more mobile
portion of the local tax base may move to a municipality with a lower
tax rate. See URBAN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 13. Similarly, individuals
and businesses giving consideration to locating in the municipality may
be deterred by the increased tax rate, thereby exacerbating the problem
of a small local tax base.
16. See Comment, Ad Valorem Financing of Law Enforcement
Services: An Equitable Solution to an Inequitable Condition, 19




political fragmentation of the seven-county metropolitan area
fails to reflect the social and economic interdependence of the
area.17 That interdependence is evidenced by the considerable
intercommunity travel within the area,'8 and by the presence of
local governmental "spillovers."' 9 Commercial and industrial
enterprises, generally staffed and patronized at least in part by
nonresidents of the municipality in which the enterprise is lo-
cated, are especially likely to be of a metropolitan character.
20
17. For a discussion of the interdependence of the seven-county
area, see MARGOLS, supra note 4, at 1-1. It should be noted that as a
metropolitan area develops and subcenters emerge in surrounding areas,
the economic interdependence of the area as a whole will decline. See
Netzer, supra note 13, at 472-73. The problem of fiscal disparities will
remain, however, since commercial and industrial development will con-
tinue to concentrate in certain municipalities. See Minneapolis Tribune,
July 16, 1971, § A, at 5, cols. 1-2 (85 percent of new commercial-industrial
tax base to locate in 15 percent of the metropolitan area over the next
25 years). See also note 32 infra.
18. See Brief for Appellants at 19-21, Village of Burnsville v.
Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916
(1975). For example, approximately one-half of the persons employed
in the metropolitan area reside in a county other than the one in which
they work, and one-third of all trips in the area begin and end in differ-
ent counties. Id.
19. "Spillovers" can be defined as the benefits or detriments one
community receives as a result of another's action or inaction. See Note,
Metropolitan Government: Minnesota's Experiment with a Metropolitan
Council, 53 MINN. L. REV. 122, 123 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Metro-
politan Government]. Thus, when political boundaries do not coincide
with the area benefited by a particular public service, either benefit or
cost spillovers may result. Benefit spillovers can be of two types: non-
residents may enter the community and make use of local services; or
the nature of the service itself may affect other areas or follow a resident
if he leaves the community. Note, Equalization of Municipal Services:
The Economics of Serrano and Shaw, 82 YALE L.J. 89, 99 (1972) [herein-
after cited as Municipal Services]. Examples of the latter type of bene-
fit spillover are preventive health care and education. Cost spillovers
are similar in form, as when local taxes are shifted to nonresidents or
when the pollution created in one community contaminates the environ-
ment of an adjoining community.
Spillovers tend to be the rule in metropolitan areas, see U.S. AD-
VISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE AID TO LocAL
GOVERNmENT 6-7 (1969) [hereinafter cited as STATE AID], and are likely
to increase with technological change and growing consumer demands.
Netzer, supra note 13, at 472-73.
The presence of spillovers alone does not mandate tax reform, how-
ever, since they may balance out between municipalities or their ef-
fects may be reduced via user charges, intergovernmental transfers, or
redefined political boundaries. See Municipal Services, supra.
20. An example is the Southdale shopping center, located in Edina,
a Minneapolis suburb. It is patronized not only by Edina residents, but
also by residents of Minneapolis and other area suburbs. The property
taxes that Southdale contributes to local governmental units are thus
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To the extent that such property increases the fiscal capacity
of a particular municipality, it does so in part through the con-
tributions of nonresidents. Thus the taxable property that is
scattered among the municipalities of the seven-county area is
in this sense a metropolitan tax base. If this social and economic
interdependence of the seven-county area is accepted, then
clearly the different costs to taxpayers of the public services pro-
vided by various municipalities stems not from any inherent dif-
ferences in the taxpayers' situations, but only from the circum-
stance of their location in municipalities of different fiscal
capacities.
The other major problem raised by the presence of fiscal dis-
parities within the metropolitan area is that of imbalance in the
development of the area. The decision of an industrial firm to
locate in a particular municipality within the metropolitan area
can be influenced by a number of factors, notably tax rate dif-
ferentials, 21 the ability of a local government to negotiate pref-
borne in part by nonresident shoppers. Admittedly, the municipality
may have to provide additional public services to the area because of
the presence of the shopping center; but the surplus in excess of such
costs that accrues to the municipality will be funded in part by nonresi-
dents.
Similarly, a factory may locate in a municipality, thereby increas-
ing that municipality's fiscal capacity, while its employees will establish
residence elsewhere. The governmental units in which the employees
live thus face increased costs, particularly for the education of the em-
ployees' children, without benefit of any corresponding increase in their
industrial tax base.
21. See U.S. ADvisoRY CozmMN ON INTERGOvERNmENTAL RELATIONS,
STATE-LOCAL TAXATION AND INDUSTRIAL LocATIoN 68-70 (1967) [herein-
after cited as STATE-LocAL TAXATION]. Nontax factors, such as location
of raw materials, markets, and labor, tend to be more influential in the
firn's selection of a particular region-as distinguished from a site within
the region. Id.
22. See URBAN AlviwucA, supra note 2, at 12. The traditional taxing
system has encouraged preferential tax treatment, see HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 8, at 6, in that there is considerable pressure on local assessors
to offer such treatment, see STATE-LocAL TAXATION, supra note 21, at 85.
The ability of Minnesota municipalities to offer preferential assessment
was reduced, however, by 1971 legislation providing that assessors be
certified by the State Board of Assessors. MmN. STAT. §§ 270.41, .48,
.50 (1974). Furthermore, a State Board of Equalization was established
to review assessments. Id. § 270.12. See also id. §§ 274.01, .13 (review
by city council and County Board of Equalization). Because of the dif-
ficulty in determining the market value of business property, however,
U.S. ADvisoRY Com-'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FPnANcING
ScHoOLS AND PROPERTY TAX RELIEF-A STATE RESPoNsIBiLiTY 71, 73 (1973)




erential assessments,22 and the provision of public services. 2 3
The possibility of augmenting their respective fiscal capacities
by attracting new industry through a manipulation of these fac-
tors causes "keen competition" among the municipalities of the
metropolitan area.
24
This competition manifests itself on both a local and a re-
gional plane. At the local level, the initial decision on the ap-
propriateness of a given development within the municipality
tends to be based on an analysis of whether the tax revenue
to be gained from that development will exceed the cost of pro-
viding the necessary public services to it. 2 5 At the regional level,
municipalities strive to influence the location or nature of area-
wide development so as to derive the greatest possible improve-
ment in their fiscal capacities; this improvement in fiscal ca-
pacity may be sought regardless of safety, environmental, or other
considerations.2 6  On the other hand, individual municipalities
resist the location within their borders of developments which
will redound to the benefit of the entire metropolitan area, but
which will not contribute to the local tax base. 27 In attempting
to allocate local land use so as to maximize the tax advantage
of their municipality, local officials may thus forgo or resist de-
23. See STArE-LocL TAXAmON, supra note 21, at 71-75.
24. Id. at 70. See also URBAN AmaICA, supra note 2, at 12 ("cut-
throat intergovernmental competition").
25. See Mlnaoms, supra note 4, at 2-22; Metropolitan Government,
supra note 19, at 125. Regulating development on this basis is termed
"fiscal zoning." Netzer, supra note 13, at 473. Its effect is most pro-
nounced when the municipality is confined to a small geographic area.
Id.
The usual tactic for discouraging unwanted development within the
municipality is exclusionary zoning. CinzEs LEAGUE, supra note 14, at
5. If, on the other hand, the development under consideration would
be an economic asset to the municipality, its growth may be encouraged
by offering preferential assessments, see House REPORT, supra note 8, at
6, or by extending water and sewer facilities to the intended site, see
Margolis, The Demand for Urban Public Services, in Issus iN URBAN
ECONOMCs 527, 535 (1968).
26. For example, although municipalities have little hope of influ-
encing the location of a freeway, they may have some effect on the num-
ber and location of freeway interchanges. The more interchanges a mu-
nicipality has within its boundaries, the more access it can offer to local
commercial or industrial development. A concern for traffic safety,
however, might call for widely spaced interchanges, thus running counter
to the economic interests of local communities. See HoUSE REPORT, supra
note 8, at 4-5.
27. For example, parks, open spaces, and wetlands might well be
sacrificed if balanced in the calculus of only one municipality, whereas
they would perhaps be preserved if the interest of the seven-county area
as a whole were to be considered. See id. at 3-4.
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velopment that might be highly desirable from the viewpoint of
noneconomic considerations.
As a result of this competition for a more productive tax
base, the seven-county area has suffered haphazard and ineffi-
cient development. Municipal ordinances designed to improve
a municipality's fiscal capacity force developers who do not meet
prescribed standards to move farther away from the center of
the area. This contributes to urban sprawl and high public ser-
vice costs in remote areas, 28 while undeveloped land nearer to
the central cities and already fully furnished with public services
is available.29 Furthermore, tax considerations hinder the con-
solidation and annexation of some of the myriad governmental
units in the seven-county area,30 thereby precluding economies
of scale in the provision of public services. Consequently, the
interest of municipalities in improving their fiscal capacities con-
flicts with what might be regarded as optimal regional develop-
ment.
Under a traditional taxing system, therefore, municipalities
have little incentive to cooperate with a regional development
plan that conflicts with their interest in maximizing fiscal capaci-
ties. Yet the need for a regional development plan is evidenced
by the legislative mandate to the Metropolitan Council3 ' to co-
28. CITIzENs LEAGUE, supra note 14, at 5-6.
29. In 1973, 41 percent of the 562 square miles in the seven-county
area served by existing sewer systems was vacant land, suitable for de-
velopment. MmaoPoLITAN CoUNcIL, METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT FRAME-
woRK INTEIMW PoLicIEs 9 (1974) (similar figures for storm sewers and
public water reported to be 34 percent and 35 percent, respectively). A
Metropolitan Council staff report estimated that two billion dollars in
development costs could be saved through 1990 by planning the area's
growth so as to utilize undeveloped land within the area. See METROPOL-
ITAN COUNcIL, A.TROPOLITI DEVELOPMENT GUIDE, ch. Development
Framework, at 3-4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as METROPOLITAN DEVELOP-
MENT GUIDE]; METROPOLITAN COUNCIL OF THE TWIN CITIEs AREA, NEWS-
LETTER, Aug. 1974, at 1.
30. For example, one obstacle to consolidation or annexation is
usually the reluctance of a richer governmental unit to share its tax base
with a poorer unit. See CrzENs LEAGUE, supra note 14, at 3-4.
31. The Metropolitan Council was created by MINN. STAT. ch. 473B
(1974). See generally S. BALDINGER, PLANNING Am) GOVERNING THE
METROPOLIS-THE TwIN CITIES EXPERIENCE (1971); Metropolitan Govern-
ment, supra note 19. The Council is responsible for providing a Develop-
ment Guide for the seven-county area, see note 33 infra, and for co-
ordinating the functions of various commissions that provide certain
services in the seven-county area. See MnNN. STAT. §§ 473B.06 (Sa), .062
(1974) (Council's powers); id. §§ 473A.051(2), .06(la) (transit); id. §§
473C.01, .06 (sewage); id. § 473D.03 (solid waste disposal); id. § 473G.04
(1) (metropolitan parks and open space). The Council also has the
power to review the long-term, comprehensive plans of independent
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ordinate and plan development for the seven-county area.32
Without some tax reform, however, the Council might expect
to encounter serious opposition to its Development Guide33 from
municipalities that would be economically injured by its imple-
mentation. 34 Thus, some way of reducing the impact of fiscal
disparities on area development and the provision of public ser-
vices was necessary in order to allow development in accordance
with a regional plan. It is this need which the Fiscal Disparities
Act attempts to meet.
II. THE FISCAL DISPARITIES ACT
A. HI-STORY AND OPERATION OF THE ACT
In 1971, the Minnesota legislature after stormy debate 5
commissions if those plans may have an area-wide or multi-community
effect, or a substantial effect on metropolitan development. Id. §
473B.06 (6).
32. For example, the Council has adopted the policy that commer-
cial and industrial growth should be clustered in several major, diversi-
fied centers, rather than being scattered throughout the metropolitan
area. MtmoPOuTAN DEVELOPMENT GuDE, supra. note 29, at 8-9, 16-17,
31. In this respect, the Fiscal Disparities Act promotes the Council's
plans by reducing the competitive need for such development to occur
in a particular community, while avoiding the otherwise inequitable re-
sult of concentrating the commercial-industrial tax base in only a few
localities. See notes 16-20 supra and accompanying text.
33. M=. STAT. § 473B.06(5) (1974) requires the Council to pro-
duce a Development Guide for the seven-county area. The Guide will
establish general policies for the area's growth. See generally Freilich
& Ragsdale, Timing and Sequential Controls-The Essential Basis for
Regional Planning: An Analysis of the New Directions for Land Use
Control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Region, 58 M=xx. L.
REv. 1009 (1974). Different levels of government share the planning and
implementation responsibilities for the Guide's Development Frame-
work; local governmental units originate plans which must accord with
the general policies established by the Council. See MimEoPoLrr&A
DEvEioPmmNT GUIDE, supra note 29, at 10-12, 39-43. See also note 104
infra.
34. See CiTnzFs LEAGUE, supra note 14, at 6; HousE REPoRT, supra
note 8, at 2. See also notes 31-32 supra.
35. The bill passed the senate by one vote. Of the 31 senators who
voted against the bill, 12 were from the seven-county area and 19 were
from outstate Minnesota. Minneapolis Tribune, June 2, 1971, § A, at 1,
cols. 2-6, at 4, cols. 4-5. Final passage in the house was by a vote of
83 to 39, with 13 of the opponents representing districts within the seven-
county area. Minneapolis Tribune, July 16, 1971, § A, at 1, cols. 4-8, §
C, at 5, cols. 5-8.
Suburban opponents feared that the bill would lead to loss of the
local tax base, reduction of incentives to attract commercial development,
and adoption of a metropolitan government. See id., § A, at 1, col. 8;
Minneapolis Tribune, June 2, 1971, § A, at 1, col. 4. The Act was also
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passed the Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act,86 which provides
a method of reducing fiscal disparities within the seven-county
area while retaining existing governmental and tax structures.
The Act, which nominally8 7 went into operation in 1972, was
greeted with national acclaim as both an innovative and a realis-
tic approach to metropolitan problems.8  Some skepticism has
been expressed, however, as to whether the Act will ultimately
be effective.3 9
The basic concept of the Fiscal Disparities Act is tax base
sharing. In particular, the Act implements a plan whereby 40
percent of the commercial-industrial growth in the seven-county
area since 1971 is to be shared by all governmental units
levying property taxes within the area. The Act places no
restrictions on where or how the shared funds can be spent by
the recipient governmental units, although it does state six objec-
tives which it is hoped the tax base sharing will accom-
plish.40 The Act, moreover, does not fundamentally change the
said to have virtually insurmountable administrative problems. See Min-
neapolis Tribune, July 16, 1971, § A, at 1, col. 8.
Rural legislators who opposed passage of the Act feared that it
would be expanded to the entire state. Id. At the time, such expansion
of the plan was politically unfeasible, although the State Planning
Agency did consider the option, finding that the outstate tax base was
insufficient to render the plan economically feasible. See J. HoYT & D.
NELSON, A REPOr oN REGioNAL TAX BASE SHARING 4 (1973).
36. Minn. Laws Extra Sess. 1971, ch. 24 (codified at MnM. STAT.
ch. 473F (1974)). The concept of tax base sharing for the seven-county
area, now embodied in the Act, originated with the Citizens League. See
generally CiTizENs L AGUrE supra note 14.
37. The first assessments under the Act were required to be com-
pleted and certified to the appropriate county auditor by November 20,
1972. Mnm. STAT. §§ 473F.04, .05 (1974). Operation of the Act was en-
joined by a Minnesota district court, however, on the ground that it vio-
lated the uniformity clause of the Minnesota Constitution. This decision
was reversed by the Minnesota Supreme Court on September 13, 1974.
Village of Burnsville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1974), appeal
dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 (1975). See notes 55-64 infra and accompanying
text.
38. See, e.g., Cordtz, A Word for the Property Tax, 85 FORTUXn, May
1972, at 105, 112; Faltermayer, 'Metro' government, Twin Cities-style, 72
Lw , Jan. 21, 1972, at 28; Editorial, Tax Base Sharing, 60 NAT'L Ciwc Rv.
424 (1971).
39. See A Statistical Analysis, supra note 11, at 1325 n.196 ("But
by restricting its scope to 'commercial-industrial property,' the plan does
little to end enclaves of low or high residential property taxes.").
40. MlNm. STAT. § 473F.01 (1974) provides:
The legislature finds it desirable to improve the revenue raising
and distribution system in the seven county Twin Cities area
to accomplish the following objectives:
(1) To provide a way for local governments to share in the
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existing tax structure or its administration;41 it merely pro-
vides a method by which property in one governmental unit can
be taxed by others.
Before exploring the workings of the Fiscal Disparities Act,
it is necessary to review several technical definitions. The focus
of the Act is upon "municipalities," which are defined by the
Act as cities, towns, or townships located in whole or in part
within the seven-county area.4 2  Municipalities are used as a
basic unit for calculating both the contributions to and the distri-
butions from the area-wide tax base. "Governmental units" are
the jurisdictional units that actually collect taxes under the Act.
They may or may not be municipalities. The Act defines them
as taxing units or bodies which levy ad valorem taxes in whole
or in part within the seven-county area; this would include such
units as counties, cities, and school districts.
48
resources generated by the growth of the area, without removing
any resources which local governments already have;
(2) To increase the likelihood of orderly urban development
by reducing the impact of fiscal considerations on the location
of business and residential growth and of highways, transit facil-
ities and airports;
(3) To establish incentives for all parts of the area to work
for the growth of the area as a whole;
(4) To provide a way whereby the area's resources can be
made available within and through the existing system of local
governments and local decision making;
(5) To help communities in different stages of development
by making resources increasingly available to communities at
those early stages of development and redevelopment when fi-
nancial pressures on them are the greatest;
(6) To encourage protection of the environment by reducing
the impact of fiscal considerations so that flood plains can be
protected and land for parks and open space can be pre-
served ....
A seventh objective, concerning the distribution to municipalities of other
revenues, is beyond the scope of this Note. See note 7 supra.
41. One of the seven county auditors serves as the "administrative
auditor" and administers the statute from his county office. Muuny.
STAT. §§ 473F.03, .07(3), (4) (1974). Each county treasurer remits the
tax revenues from the shared tax base to the state treasurer, who de-
posits the revenues in an area-wide tax account from which they are
subsequently distributed to governmental units in the same manner as
are all other tax revenues. Id. §§ 473F.08(7), (8). Assessment of the
market value of commercial-industrial property within each jurisdiction
takes place as it did before passage of the Act.
42. Id. § 473F.02(8). See also note 1 supra.
43. ANN. STAT. § 473F.02(5) (1974). See also note 1 supra.
Seventeen school districts and three municipalities are located partly
within and partly without the seven-county area. The Act deals to some
extent with these divided governmental units. Section 473F.02 (8) limits
the Act's application to property located within the seven-county area,
although each municipality's fiscal capacity is to be computed on the
basis of its entire property valuation and population. Section 473F.07 (3)
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The first step in the operation of the Act is to determine
the area-wide tax base. Every year, the assessors of each county
in the metropolitan area assess the value of all non-exempt com-
mercial-industrial property located within the municipalities of
that county. This amount is then compared with the assessed
valuation44 of such property in 1971, the base year. Forty per-
cent of the increase over the 1971 valuation is then contributed
by the municipality to the area-wide tax base for the given
year.45 If the market value of the commercial-industrial prop-
erty within a municipality shows no increase over 1971, that mu-
nicipality makes no contribution to the area-wide tax base. The
sum of the contributions from all the municipalities in the entire
seven-county area constitutes the area-wide tax base.
In order to determine the share of the area-wide tax base
which each municipality is to receive, a distribution index, based
on the population and fiscal capacity of each, must be calcu-
lated.46 A particular municipality then receives a share of the
area-wide tax base proportional to the ratio of its index to the
sum of the indices of all municipalities within the seven-county
area.47 Whether the municipality gains or loses assessed valua-
tion under the plan depends on whether the share it receives
is larger or smaller than the one which it has contributed.
48
provides that the municipality's area-wide tax base distribution index,
see note 46 infra, must be multiplied by the fraction of the municipality's
population residing in the seven-county area.
44. Valuation is defined as the market value of the real property
within a municipality. MINN. STAT. § 473F.02 (13) (1974). Assessed val-
uation is thus the percentage of the valuation which Minnesota subjects
to the tax. See id. § 273.13.
45. Id. §§ 473F.05-.07.
46. The area-wide tax base distribution index for a municipality is
equal to its population multiplied by the ratio of the average fiscal
capacity for the seven-county area to the municipality's fiscal capacity
(both measured in the prior year) multiplied by two; if the product of
those factors is less than the municipality's population, however, the in-
dex is equal to the population. Id. § 473F.07 (3).
47. Id. §§473F.07(3)-(5).
48. Whether a municipality gains or loses tax dollars under the plan
depends on the relationship between its local tax rate and the area-wide
tax rate. See text accompanying notes 52-53 infra. The amount of tax
dollars a municipality contributes to the area-wide tax account is equal
to the assessed valuation contributed by the municipality to the area-
wide tax base multiplied by the area-wide tax rate. The amount of tax
revenue a municipality receives is equal to its share of the area-wide
tax base multiplied by the local tax rate. See note 51 infra and ac-
companying text. Thus, even if on balance a municipality loses assessed
valuation to the area-wide tax base, it could receive more tax dollars
than it contributes to the area-wide tax account if its local tax rate is
sufficiently greater than the area-wide tax rate. A similar situation may
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Once the contributions to and the distributions from the
area-wide tax base have been calculated for municipalities, the
focus shifts to the governmental unit so that the mechanics of ac-
tually collecting tax revenues under the Act may be worked
out. Initially, each governmental unit must ascertain its local
tax base; this is done by determining the assessed valuation of
all nonexempt real property within the governmental unit and
subtracting the contributions made to the area-wide tax base by
municipalities located in whole or in part within its jurisdic-
tion.49 The governmental unit must also ascertain its share of
the area-wide tax base; this share is determined by adding to-
gether the distributions to which all municipalities located in
whole or in part within the unit's jurisdiction are entitled.50
Aware of the size of the tax bases upon which it can levy a tax,
the governmental unit then determines the amount that it desires
to raise in tax revenue and certifies this amount to the appropri-
ate county auditor as its levy. The county auditor will subse-
quently apportion that levy between the local tax base-that is,
that part of the particular governmental unit's assessed valuation
which was not contributed to the area-wide tax base-and the
unit's share of the area-wide tax base.5 '
The first portion is termed the local levy. The local levy
divided by the local tax base equals the local tax rate, a rate
which will be applied to all taxable property within the jurisdic-
exist for other governmental units. See notes 49-53 infra and accom-
panying text.
49. The contribution of a governmental unit to the area-wide tax
base is proportionate to the assessed valuation of the commercial-in-
dustrial property located within each municipality subject to that unit's
taxing power. MN. STAT. § 473F.08 (2) (a) (1974). Thus, if one-half
of the commercial-industrial property in a particular municipality were
subject to taxation by the unit, one-half of the amount contributed by
the municipality to the area-wide tax base would be subtracted from
the unit's tax base. This procedure would be repeated for all municipal-
ities in which the unit levies taxes.
50. The proportion of each municipality's distribution to which a
governmental unit is entitled is calculated by dividing the assessed val-
uation of all residential property within a municipality subject to the
unit's taxing power by the total assessed valuation of all residential
property within that municipality. Id. § 473F.08 (2) (b).
51. The area-wide levy is equal to that portion of the total levy
represented by the unit's share of the area-wide tax base divided by the
sum of the unit's local tax base and its share of the area-wide tax base.
Id. §§ 473F.08(2), (3) (a). The local levy is equal to the difference be-
tween the total levy and the area-wide levy. Id. § 473F.08 (3) (b). The
ratio of the area-wide levy to the local levy is thus equivalent to the




tion of the governmental unit-except for commercial-indus-
trial property, to which it applies only in part. 2 The other por-
tion of the levy, that allocated to the area-wide tax base by the
county auditor, is added to the levies requested by all other
governmental units in the seven-county area; the result is the
area-wide levy. Dividing this area-wide levy by the area-wide
tax base yields the area-wide tax rate.53
To recapitulate, a particular governmental unit may receive
revenues from two sources under the Act. First, the local tax
base taxed at the local tax rate will produce revenue equivalent
to the local levy; and second, the unit will receive revenue in
the amount of its area-wide levy. In addition, unlike other prop-
erty, the commercial-industrial property located within munici-
palities which have shown an increase in the assessed valuation
of such property since 1971 is subject to both the local and the
area-wide tax rate. A portion of the assessed value of each indi-
vidual commercial-industrial parcel within these municipalities
-whether that parcel showed an increase in valuation since 1971
or not-is subject to the area-wide tax rate. The portion of each
parcel subject to that tax rate is determined by dividing 40 per-
cent of the growth in the municipality's entire commercial-
industrial assessed valuation since 1971 by the total assessed
valuation of all the commercial-industrial property in the mu-
nicipality.54 The remainder of the assessed valuation of each
parcel is subject to the local tax rate.
B. CONSTTTONMAY OF THE ACT
In early 1973, a Minnesota district court enjoined the opera-
tion of the Fiscal Disparities Act as violating the uniformity
clause of the Minnesota Constitution,56 which provides that
"[t]axes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, and
shall be levied and collected for public purposes .... ,,5 The
52. Id. § 473F.08 (4). See note 54 infra.
53. Mxxx. STAT. § 473F.08 (5) (1974). The operation of the Fiscal
Disparities Act is illustrated in the Appendix, infra.
54. MnqN. STAT. § 473F.08 (6) (1974). For example, if 4D percent
of the increase in the municipality's assessed valuation of commercial-
industrial property since 1971 were equal to one-tenth of that municipal-
ity's total assessed valuation of commercial-industrial property, then
one-tenth of the assessed valuation of each commercial-industrial parcel
in that municipality would be subject to the area-wide tax rate.
55. See Village of Burnsville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523, 527-28
(Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 (1975).
56. lN. CONST. art. 9, § 1.
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Minnesota Supreme Court had previously held that tax legisla-
tion must satisfy two requirements in order to be valid under
this clause: similarly situated taxpayers must be treated alike,57
and special benefits must accrue to the community that bears
the tax.5 8 Relying principally on the latter of these two require-
ments, the district court held that there was no reasonable rela-
tionship between the contribution made by a municipality to the
area-wide tax base and the benefits that its citizens would derive
from the distribution of funds under the Act.59 In other words,
the main issue of the case was whether those units of govern-
ment within the metropolitan area which in a given year con-
tribute more of their tax base to the pool than is redistributed
to them are sufficiently benefited to meet the constitutional re-
quirement of uniformity.6 0
In a four-three decision in Village of Burnsville v. Oni-
schuk,0 ' the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
Act satisfies the requirements of the uniformity clause; an appeal
to the United States Supreme Court was dismissed for want of
a substantial federal question. The Minnesota court admitted
that a "literal reading" of its prior decisions would have dictated
invalidation of the Act because special benefits would not accrue
to each governmental unit on which the tax was imposed.
62
Nonetheless, the court stated that requiring a special benefit to
accrue to the governmental unit
no longer adequately serves the constitutional requirement of
uniformity. In a seven-county area which is heavily populated,
... it is no longer necessary for units of government providing
tax revenue to receive the kind of tangible and specific benefits
to which our court has previously referred . . . to satisfy the
uniformity clause.03
Instead, the court found that governmental units which con-
tribute more than they receive under the Act derive benefits
57. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Comm'r of Taxation, 216
Minn. 307, 310, 12 N.W.2d 625, 627 (1943).
58. See City of Jackson v. County of Jackson, 214 Minn. 244, 7
N.W.2d 753 (1943); Village of Robbinsdale v. County of Hennepin, 199
Minn. 203, 207, 271 N.W. 491, 493 (1937); Sanborn v. Comnm'rs of Rice
County, 9 Minn. (9 Gill.) 258, 262 (1864).
59. The statute "imposes a tax on some [units] for the benefit of
others." 222 N.W.2d at 528, quoting the trial court memorandum.
60. Id. at 529.
61. 222 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916
(1975) (no substantial federal question). Burnsville, the municipality
that challenged the Act, can be characterized a a developing suburb.
62. Id. at 530.
63. Id.
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from the area-wide tax base by reason of the social and economic
interdependence of the seven-county area. Hence, residents "of
highly developed commercial-industrial areas . . . enjoy direct
benefits from the existence of adjacent municipalities which pro-
vide open spaces, lakes, parks, golf courses, zoos, fairgrounds, low
density housing areas, churches, schools, and hospitals."
6 4
Two aspects of the court's decision deserve comment. First,
the Fiscal Disparities Act is tax legislation and thus is entitled to
a presumption of validity.6 5 This deference is essential to allow
the legislature to reform local property taxes in the most effi-
cient and realistic manner.66 In Onischuk, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court expressly accorded such deference to the legisla-
ture's scheme for reducing fiscal disparities.
Second, even though the court found that the "special bene-
fit" requirement did not invalidate the Fiscal Disparities Act,
that requirement was not completely abandoned: residents must
still derive some threshold benefit from the allocation of taxes
under a challenged statute.67 The court in Onischuk merely re-
vised its view of the uniformity clause to take into account what
it called "a developing concept of the meaning of the word 'bene-
fit.' "68 That concept apparently centers around an implicit
recognition that benefits can be derived from the social and eco-
nomic interdependence of the seven-county area.60 This percep-
64. Id. at 532.
65. Courts traditionally defer to the legislative judgment on tax leg-
islation because the subject matter is complex, because courts tend to
lack familiarity with local problems, and because a stricter standard of
review would entail inquiry into the purpose of the statute, an especially
difficult matter with respect to tax legislation. Tussman & tenBroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 370 n.68, 372-
73 (1949). See, e.g., General Mills, Inc. v. Division of Employment &
Security, 224 Minn. 306, 310-11, 28 N.W.2d 847, 849-50 (1947).
66. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
58 (1973)
67. 222 N.W.2d at 530-32.
68. Id. at 530. The court cited Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177,
89 N.W.2d 635 (1958), as the precursor of this "evolving" notion of bene-
fit. Visina involved a challenge under the uniformity clause to the stat-
ute establishing the Port Authority of Duluth, an agency which was to
finance the reclamation of land and the construction of a terminal port
facility. In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that all in-
volved taxpayers received benefits sufficient to uphold the statute's con-
stitutionality. Yet Visina concerned benefits that would be derived from
a specific improvement, whereas Onischuk involved benefits to be de-
rived from undetermined uses of redistributed revenues-benefits arising
from the social-economic interdependence of the area.
69. See text accompanying note 64 supra. The court also acknowl-
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tion of benefit is based on the realization that the political frag-
mentation of the seven-county area is artificial and that the
area is actually a socially and economically integrated entity. In
essence, the seven-county area can be viewed as a large city
rather than as numerous, completely autonomous political subdi-
visions.
In ruling on the constitutionality of the Fiscal Disparities
Act, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not explicitly address the
equal protection issue raised by the plaintiffs.7 0 Thus, it might
be argued that the statute remains open to a constitutional chal-
lenge on that ground.71 It seems likely, however, that the court
edged that commercial-industrial property can provide a windfall to the
municipality in which it locates, and that competition for such property
could lead to disorderly development of the seven-county area. 222 N.W.
2d at 532.
70. In their complaint, plaintiffs had alleged that the statute vio-
lated the equal protection provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution. 222 N.W,2d at 526. Both the district and
supreme courts, however, ruled explicitly only on the uniformity ground.
In passing over the equal protection issue, the supreme court seemed
to indicate that its inattention was attributable to the fact that the
uniformity clause has been construed "to be no more restrictive than
the [federal] equal protection clause." Id. at 527. See In re Taxes
on Property of Cold Spring Granite Co., 271 Minn. 460, 466, 136 N.W.2d
782, 787 (1965); Apartment Operators Ass'n v. Minneapolis, 191 Minn.
365, 366, 254 N.W. 443, 444 (1934); Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 261,
253 N.W. 102, 105 (1934). See also Lake Superior Consol. Iron Mines
v. Lord, 271 U.S. 577, 581 (1926).
71. There is a line of cases which suggests that the Act could not
be successfully challenged under the federal equal protection clause.
Thus, while the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the uniformity
required by the Minnesota Constitution in the distribution of tax benefits
is achieved if there is a reasonable relationship between tax benefits and
burdens, see Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 195, 89 N.W.2d 635, 650
(1958) (uniformity of distribution among several taxing districts); Vil-
lage of Robbinsdale v. County of Hennepin, 199 Minn. 203, 271 N.W. 491
(1937) (uniformity of distribution within one taxing district); State ex
rel. City of New Prague v. County of Scott, 195 Minn. 111, 261 N.W. 863
(1935) (uniformity of distribution within one taxing district), some
courts have stated that the fourteenth amendment does not require that
a tax bear a reasonable relationship to the benefits received. See Car-
michael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 521-23 (1937);
Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 278-80 (1897); Hess v. Mullaney, 213 F.2d
635, 639-40 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 836 (1954); Morton Salt Co.
v. City of South Hutchinson, 177 F.2d 889, 891-92 (10th Cir. 1949);
Lafayette Steel Co. v. City of Dearborn, 360 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (E.D.
Mich. 1973). The latter view, however, may not apply to the situation
in Onischuk. Those cases involved general taxes, see Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Decatur, 147 U.S. 190, 196-97 (1892); Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S.
78, 80-83 (1881), and the statute in each instance was challenged by a
member of a community whose government was supported by the
disputed taxes. The Fiscal Disparities Act, on the other hand, shifts local
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implicitly ruled on this issue.72 This fact, as well as the practical
property tax revenues from one governmental unit to another. Under
the Act, a taxpayer in one community may be taxed for the benefit of
a community of which he is not a member and from which he receives
no general benefits. On this basis, the Act is distinguishable from the
cases cited above and may be subject to scrutiny under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Ad Valorem Financing,
supra note 16, at 81-83.
Two possible claims could be made under the equal protection
clause. First, by limiting the area-wide tax base to commercial-indus-
trial growth, the Act is arguably underinclusive since residential prop-
erty above a certain value may provide as much of a windfall to the
fiscal capacity of a governmental unit as does commercial-industrial
property. Even though the capacity of high income housing for generat-
ing tax revenue may be less than that of commercial-industrial property,
the former requires less expense for public services, and thus could pro-
vide a windfall to the governmental unit; residential suburbs with high
fiscal capacities are examples of governmental units receiving such wind-
falls. It should be noted, however, that residential property lacks the
'"metropolitan" aspect of commercial-industrial property. See note 20
supra and accompanying text.
Second, the apportionment of the area-wide tax base among area
municipalities is not necessarily linked to deficiencies in their fiscal ca-
pacities. Rather, the Act's distribution formula is based primarily on a
municipality's population, see text accompanying notes 78-87 infra, a
measure which fails to take into account the actual needs and costs faced
by municipalities in the seven-county area. By allowing residential
suburbs with relatively high fiscal capacities to share the area-wide tax
base on the same basis as municipalities with lower fiscal capacities and
greater public service costs, the Act might be overinclusive as to its class
of beneficiaries.
72. The equal protection issue was raised in the pleadings, see
222 N.W.2d at 526, and was briefly referred to by the district and su-
preme courts, see id. at 527. The comment of the Minnesota Supreme
Court that the uniformity clause has been construed to be "no more re-
strictive" than the equal protection clause, see note 70 supra, appears to
indicate that the court felt it was resolving both issues. If, as seems
likely, the issue was considered by the Minnesota court, it must have
been resolved in favor of the statute's constitutionality; otherwise, the
case could not have been decided as it was. Thus, a strong argument
can be made that the equal protection issue was litigated and decided
by implication in the Onischuk case.
If this argument is accepted, the Onischuk decision places two doc-
trinal obstacles in the path of a future taxpayer plaintiff. The first is
that of traditional stare decisis. The other is that of res judicata, under
which the parties to an action may be estopped from relitigating in a
subsequent action issues that were raised and determined in the prior
action. See generally Brooks Realty, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 268 Minn. 122,
128 N.W.2d 151 (1964). Specific findings are unnecessary; the doctrine
applies to every issue which was actually litigated or raised by the
pleadings in the original case. See Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prout,
266 Minn. 450, 470, 124 N.W.2d 328, 342 (1963); Gollner v. Cram, 258
Minn. 8, 10-11, 102 N.W.2d 521, 523 (1960); Prendergast v. Searle, 81
Minn. 291, 292, 84 N.W. 107, 108 (1900); O'Brien v. Manwaring, 79 Minn.
86, 87-88, 81 N.W. 746 (1900). In the present situation, the doctrine of
res judicata would have an effect beyond the original plaintiffs, since
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unavailability of a federal forum, 73 makes it improbable that the
Act will again be subjected to judicial review on equal protection
grounds.
The holding in Onischuk may prove to be a narrow one. The
court's emphasis on the social and economic interdependence of
the seven-county area7 4 suggests that its new interpretation of
the term "special benefit" 75 may be limited by the requirement
of such interdependence. Even so, the decision may have a far
reaching impact on regionalism; similar statutory schemes could
be established in other parts of the state where an area is found
to be socially and economically interdependent. The interde-
the determination in an action brought by one taxpayer binds other tax-
payers to the same extent that it binds the original plaintiff. Oakman
v. City of Eveleth, 163 Minn. 100, 102, 203 N.W. 514, 515 (1925); Driscoll
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 161 Minn. 494, 500-02, 201 N.W. 945, 947-
48 (1925).
73. A federal court would probably refuse to assume jurisdiction
of a challenge to the Act under the federal equal protection clause for
at least two reasons. First, when the Onischuk case was appealed to
the United States Supreme Court on equal protection grounds, among
others, the Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.
420 U.S. 916 (1975) (issues of taxation without representation and due
process were also raised). It is unclear what effect the dismissal
will have on future equal protection challenges to the Act. Compare
Ohio ex tel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
separate opinion); P. BATOR, P. MIsmux, D. SHAPIRO & H. WEcHsLER,
HART AND WECBSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 649
(2d ed. 1970); R. STERN & E. GREssmA, SuPREnm COURT PRACTICE 233
(4th ed. 1969); Note, The Insubstantial Federal Question, 62 HAnv. L. REv.
488, 494 (1949) (taking the view that dismissal for want of a substan-
tial federal question is a decision on the merits), with Comment, The
Significance of Dismissals "For Want of a Substantial Federal Question":
Original Sin in the Federal Courts, 68 CoLum. L. REv. 785 (1968) (taking
the view that such a dismissal is in many cases akin to a denial of certi-
orari, which lacks precedential weight).
Second, the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970), may
preclude a federal court from assuming jurisdiction. That statute pro-
vides that "the district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law when a plain,
speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
Id. See, e.g., Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1974). The
very occurrence of the Onischuk suit is strong evidence that such a rem-
edy exists in Minnesota. Moreover, federal declaratory relief, though
still technically available, 1A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f .207, at 2285
(2d ed. 1959), is a discretionary remedy governed by general equitable
principles. It has usually been denied in cases attacking state tax legis-
lation where an adequate remedy exists under state law. E.g., Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943). See Lynch v.
Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 542-43 n.6 (1972).
74. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
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pendence itself would appear to meet the threshold requirement
of benefit necessary to validate the tax scheme.
The fact that additional use of this statutory scheme would
be found constitutional, however, does not mean that it will come
into common use. There is a basic political conflict between the
sort of regionalism that the Fiscal Disparities Act represents and
local autonomy. The Act itself was a compromise, partially in-
troducing regional financing of governmental units while at the
same time retaining local decisionmaking. Whether this compro-
mise is likely to be repeated or not depends heavily on the effect
of the present Act.
III. EFFECT OF THE FISCAL DISPARITIES ACT:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
As previously noted,7 6 the presence of fiscal disparities
within the seven-county metropolitan area has had two major
effects: inequities in the provision of public services and imbal-
ance in area development. The success of the Fiscal Disparities
Act will thus be largely contingent on the extent to which it
eliminates those problems.
A. PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES
Fiscal disparities produce inequities in the tax rates which
residents of different governmental units must pay in order to
obtain a given level of public services.7 7 The effectiveness of
the Act in equalizing those tax burdens will depend upon the
degree to which the factors chosen to measure "fiscal capacity"
relate to the problems that the Act is intended to solve, and also
upon the extent to which a perceived fiscal capacity will influ-
ence the Act's distribution formula.
Fiscal capacity can be measured in two ways: through the
use of economic indicators such as income levels, or by a compari-
son of the revenues that would be raised in different municipali-
ties by a representative tax system.7 8 The Fiscal Disparities Act
relies on the second conceptual measure of fiscal capacity, de-
fining the fiscal capacity of a municipality as the market value
of the real property within its borders divided by its popula-
tion,7 9 and using the real property tax-the prime generator of
76. See text accompanying notes 8-34 supra.
77. See notes 11-20 supra and accompanying text.
78. See MEAsURES, supra note 11, at 4-8, 13-52.
79. MNN. STAT. §§ 473F.02(13), (14) (1974).
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local government revenues-as its representative tax. The use
of the market value of real property rather than its assessed
valuation is desirable, since it will eliminate inter-municipality
differences which might arise from varying assessment practices
as well as from Minnesota's property classifications."0 Market
values also serve as some indicator of the income received and
produced within the municipality.8 ' Nevertheless, the use of
population as a divisor in the Act's definition of fiscal capacity
renders that definition a per capita index, reflecting the assump-
tion that a municipality's expenditure requirements vary directly
with its population. This assumption, however, ignores the fact
that the composition of a municipality's population may have an
extraordinary effect upon that municipality's need for public ser-
vices.8 2 To some extent, the limitation on the Act's definition
of fiscal capacity may be attributed to statistical deficiencies-
a lack of data that impedes both the determination of an accurate
measure of fiscal capacity and the usefulness of such a formula
once it has been devised. 3 Even so, the Act's definition fails
to account for grants-in-aid that a municipality may receive from
outside sources, funds which are certain to affect fiscal capacity
and which should be readily ascertainable.
Once determined, fiscal capacity may be at best a fractional
part of the distribution formula of the Act. Under the Act, a
municipality's area-wide tax base distribution index is propor-
tional to its population and inversely proportional to its fiscal
80. Mm'oPoLrrAN CouNcL, supra note 13, at 50. Minnesota classi-
fies property and, based upon that classification, applies a particular per-
centage figure to the property's market value to arrive at the property's
assessed valuation. See Mn-. STAT. § 273.13 (1974).
81. M=mpoOLrrAN CouNcIL, supra note 13, at 50. The market value
of residential property serves as a fairly accurate measure of personal
income, but commercial and industrial property values are less closely
related to business income. MARGOLIs, supra note 4, at 4-5, 4-6, 4-11, 5-4.
82. For example, the age distribution of the population may affect
public service requirements. If a municipality's population is relatively
young (requiring schools) or relatively old (requiring assistance), the
municipality's public service expenditures will be greater than if this
were not the case. MEAsuaRs, supra note 11, at 9, 97-105. Generally,
central cities such as Minneapolis and St. Paul contain a greater per-
centage of these special populations than do the suburbs. See E. BRAMNT,
R. JACKSON & J. WHITE, TxE PLIGHT OF TiE CITIES (1972); E. BRANDT,
THE PLIGHT OF THE CITIxs (Supp. 1973).
83. See METROPOLITAN CoUNcIL, supra note 13, at 51. Compare, for
example, the recommendation of a fiscal capacity formula based on in-
come received and produced within a community, MARGOLIS, supra note
4, at 3-9, with the Metropolitan Council's recommendation of a formula
based on the market value of real property, METROPOLITAN COuNcIL,
supra note 13, at 51.
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capacity,8 4 unless a municipality's fiscal capacity exceeds twice
the average fiscal capacity of the area, in which case its distribu-
tion index equals its population.85 Population is therefore ac-
tually utilized twice in the distribution formula: first, as an ele-
ment in the determination of fiscal capacity; and, second, as a
factor in the formula itself. Population alone, however, is not
an accurate measure of a municipality's public needs.3 6 Because
of this reliance on population, the distribution formula of the
Act will be of limited effectiveness in reducing fiscal disparities
and the resulting inequities in tax burdens. Municipalities will
still be unable to provide a given level of public services at a
uniform cost.
8 7
But this objection remains somewhat abstract. A more con-
crete understanding of the Act's relationship to the provision of
public services can best be achieved by examining the possible
effects of the statute in three types of communities.
84. A municipality's area-wide tax base distribution index is equal
to the product of its population, the average fiscal capacity for the area
divided by the municipality's fiscal capacity, and two:
Pop. X ((avg. f.c.)/(f.c.)) x 2
MINN. STAT. § 473F.07(3) (1974). Since the average fiscal capacity, id.
§ 473F.02(15), is a constant for each municipality, if K is designated as
2 X (avg. f.c.), a municipality's share of the area-wide tax base equals:
Pop. x ((avg. f.c.)/(f.c.)) X 2 = K X ((pop)/(f.c.)).
85. The formula used in the calculation of a municipality's area-
wide tax distribution index does not take account of the amount by
which a municipality's fiscal capacity exceeds twice the average fiscal
capacity; the possibility exists, therefore, that a particular municipality
could receive an unneeded additional amount of the area-wide tax base.
This situation arises because of the presence of the numeral two as a
factor in the formula and because the index is not allowed to be less
than a municipality's population. Id. § 473F.07(3). For example,
if r equals average fiscal capacity and s equals the fiscal capacity
of a municipality, then where p equals the population of that mu-
nicipality, p > p x (r/s) X 2, for any s > 2r. In 1970 only two small
municipalities in the seven-county area, however, had fiscal capacities
greater than twice the average fiscal capacity; thus the problem may
be negligible. See Brief for Appellants at Add-31, Village of Burns-
ville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed, 420
U.S. 916 (1975).
86. See note 82 supra. A true measure of need may be impossible
to express in any formula. See Municipal Services, supra note 19, at
112. See also McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ili. 1968), aff'd
mem. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
87. The discussion regarding municipalities also applies to other
governmental units that calculate their distribution from the area-wide
tax base according to the amounts municipalities within their taxing ju-
risdiction receive. Insofar as these units are larger in area than munici-




1. Residential Suburbs with a High Fiscal Capacity
Residential suburbs generally have a low proportion of com-
mercial-industrial to total assessed valuation. If a residential
suburb has a high fiscal capacity-because, for example, of high
property values-it may well benefit unduly from the operation
of the Act. Such a municipality would contribute relatively
little to the area-wide tax base; yet, because distribution is based
primarily on population, it would almost certainly be assured
of showing a net gain under the statute. Thus, an already su-
perior ability to provide public services to residents would be
further enhanced by the Act.88
2. Municipalities with Commercial-Industrial Development
Although a municipality with a high proportion of commer-
cial-industrial to total assessed valuation may have a corres-
pondingly high fiscal capacity, that municipality must provide
services such as fire and police protection to the commercial-
industrial property. Where the municipality also has a small
population, however, it will receive less than it contributes to
the area-wide tax base. If the cost of providing services to the
commercial-industrial property is greater than the tax revenues
that such property will generate after the redistribution man-
dated by the Act, the burden of providing the services will par-
tially fall upon the residents of the municipality.8 9 In this re-
spect, the Act may actually hinder the provision of public ser-
vices in those municipalities with a small population and a fiscal
88. See Village of Burnsville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523, 538-39,
541 (Minn. 1974) (dissenting opinions), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916
(1975). Cf. Stephens, The Metropolitan Impact of Fiscal and Govern-
mental Reforms: A Simple Model of the Metropolis, 2 URBAN LAW.
495, 510 (1970). But see CrrizENs LEAGUE, supra note 14, at 16 (deem-
phasizing this problem because of the benefit to school districts encom-
passing residential suburbs with high fiscal capacities).
89. Before enactment of the Fiscal Disparities Act, those residents
would not have been so burdened, if it is assumed that revenues from
the commercial-industrial property would have covered the cost of pro-
viding services to the property. But it is difficult to estimate the true
cost of serving commercial and industrial property. Usually commer-
cial-industrial development is considered to be a fiscal advantage for a
municipality, but a conservative view would be that the cost of services
to such property consumes the tax revenues that it generates. Although
some municipalities may benefit greatly from commercial-industrial
property within their borders, there is no agreement that this will be




capacity composed primarily of commercial-industrial assessed
valuation.9 0
3. Certain Governmental Units Noncoterminus with
Municipalities
Governmental units other than municipalities determine
both their contribution to and their share of the area-wide tax
base on the basis of the municipalities wholly or partly within
their boundaries.9 1 When the boundaries of a governmental unit
do not coincide with municipal lines, the unit may be either the
beneficiary or the victim of the uneven distribution of residential
and commercial-industrial property in the divided municipality.
For example, if a municipality is located within two governmen-
tal units so that one of the units possesses a large percentage
of the residential valuation of the municipality while the other
unit has a large percentage of the municipality's commercial-
industrial valuation, the former unit will contribute little to the
area-wide tax base but will receive a large share in the popula-
tion-based distribution. For similar reasons, the latter unit will
"lose" in the distribution. If the governmental unit in which
the residential area is located also has a high fiscal capacity rela-
tive to the other unit, such a result would be contrary to the
statute's intent. This effect will be significant, however, only
when the governmental units cover a relatively small area;
over large areas such uneven distributions should tend to balance
out.
To the extent that these and other adverse consequences oc-
cur, the Act's success in reducing fiscal disparities will be under-
mined. Even if the Act ultimately equalizes the benefits that
residents of the seven-county area receive for their tax dollars,
however, inequities may nonetheless arise while the Act is being
implemented. Before the passage of the Act, residents living in
a municipality with a high fiscal capacity may have enjoyed a
90. If poor people tend to live in municipalities with a high com-
mercial-industrial valuation, a distribution of this nature may resemble a
"befuddled Robin Hood," taking from the poor and giving to the indi-
vidually wealthy who reside in the suburban municipalities with high
fiscal capacities. See A Statistical Analysis, supra note 11, at 1337-38.
Recognizing the general problem illustrated by this example, the
Metropolitan Council recommended a percentage equalization plan for
municipalities and a sharing of commercial-industrial growth for school
districts, which provide no direct services to commercial-industrial prop-
erty. See METROPOLITAN CouNcIL, supra note 13.
91. See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text.
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high level of public expenditures at a relatively low tax rate.
They may have found this advantage capitalized in their prop-
erty values, whereas residents of a municipality with a low fiscal
capacity may have suffered depressed property values.9 2 Fol-
lowing implementation of the Act and the resulting equaliza-
tion of these advantages and disadvantages, property values in
a wealthy municipality should drop while those in a poor mu-
nicipality should rise. During the interim, owners and lessees
in the former locality will suffer from this adjustment, while
occupants of the latter will benefit.9 3 Inasmuch as the Act will
have only a moderating impact on fiscal disparities in the seven-
county area, however, these effects may be so gradual as not
to be serious.
In discussing the impact of the Act on the provision of public
services, consideration must go beyond the question whether
the Act will indeed have its anticipated effect on the ability of
92. See generally MAGoris, supra note 4, at app. 1-A; Oates, The
Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property
Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hy-
pothesis, 77 J. POL. EcoN. 957 (1969). See also Smith, Property Tax
Capitalization in San Francisco, 23 NAT'L TAx 3. 177 (1970).
Tax capitalization occurs where property values rise because a sub-
stantial number of prospective residents, in making their locational deci-
sion, consider the mix of tax rate and public services that various com-
munities offer. A model based on this notion is the Tiebout hypothesis.
See generally Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. PoL.
EcoN. 416 (1956). Theoretically, if tax advantages are capitalized fully
into property values, taxpayers who are residents of different municipali-
ties having different fiscal capacities will pay equivalent sums for public
services. The resident of the municipality with the higher fiscal capacity
will find that his lower taxes force him to pay more for his housing,
while the resident of the poorer municipality will find his taxes higher
but his housing cheaper. Thus, the total payments of each for public
services may be the same, merely being apportioned differently between
tax and rent payments.
93. Oates, supra note 92, at 958-59, 959 n.3. For example, an indi-
vidual who buys property in a municipality with a high fiscal capacity
pays an inflated price because the municipality's tax advantages are cap-
italized in the market value of that property. After implementation of
the Act, such a municipality's tax advantages will diminish. The indi-
vidual will find not only that his tax dollar buys less public services,
but also that his property is worth less than it formerly was. Con-
versely, a property owner in a municipality with a low fiscal capacity
will find that his tax dollar will be worth more as reflected in the
amount of public services it will purchase, and also that this advantage
will be capitalized in the value of his property-a windfall increase to
him. Exactly who will be benefited and who will be hurt, of course,
depends upon one's view of the incidence of the property tax, a matter
over which there is some controversy. See FINACING ScHooLs, supra
note 22, at 131-33, app. C.
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local governments to provide these services. The Fiscal Dispari-
ties Act expressly relies on existing local governmental structure
and local decisionmaking; in effect, local governments retain dis-
cretion in both the raising and the spending of revenues received
from the area-wide tax base. Because of this discretion, any in-
creased ability to raise revenues for public services which results
from the operation of the Act will not necessarily be converted
into such services. Whether a governmental unit which loses
under the Act will raise its tax rate to restore the previous level
of expenditures for public services or simply reduce the quantum
of those services is not controlled by the Act.94 And a unit which
gains under the Act could choose to lower its tax rate or spend
the funds on other projects, rather than increase its level of pub-
lic services.
Thus, if the Act is successful in reducing fiscal disparities,
its effect will be to remove the size of the local tax base as a
determining factor in local governmental spending decisions, al-
lowing other considerations to be given more weight. The Act
thereby enables a governmental unit to fund public services in
an amount based to a greater degree on the unit's preference
for those services. In this way, the Act tends to equalize the
resources of communities, while allowing them the freedom to
use their equalized resources as they see fit.
It might be argued, however, that in an urban area composed
of a myriad of local governmental units lacking the size, popula-
tion, and fiscal resources to provide public services rationally,
the ideal of local self-determination is superseded-or at least
outweighed-by notions of equality, in the sense of equal tax
burdens for a uniform level of services. 95 On the basis of effi-
ciency-and perhaps fairness, if benefit and cost spillovers are
not otherwise recompensed-the present system of local self-de-
termination should give way to an alternative local governmental
structure that can provide a standard level of services through-
out the metropolitan area at a uniform cost to all residents.20
94. Cf. R. REIcSAuER & R. HARTMAN, REFORMING SCHOOL FINANCE
88-90 (1973); A Statistical Analysis, supra note 11, at 1335 n.115.
95. Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973); Areen & Ross, The Rodriguez Case: Judicial Oversight of School
Finance, 1973 Sup. CT. Ray. 33, 45; Bateman & Brown, Some Reflections
on Serrano v. Priest, 49 J. URBAN LAw 701, 705-09 (1972).
96. For a list of criteria relevant to evaluating local governmental
structure and also an enumeration of eleven approaches to local govern-
ment reorganization, see Metropolitan Government, supra note 19, at 134-
42. For a comprehensive analysis of public services and their efficien-
cies, see U.S. ADVISORY Comnw'N ON INTERGOVERNmENTAL RELATIONS, PER-
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Such an alternative structure could take the form of a special
taxing district providing a single service;97 a metropolitan gov-
ernment furnishing all public services; 98 or a federated metro-
politan government, with the metropolitan government and its
subdivisions each supplying certain public services.99
Opposing this argument is the contention that if local self-
determination were to be substantially curtailed, not only would
the traditional values of local political autonomy be sacrificed 0 0
but a source of public funds might also be lost. 0 '1 Moreover,
local autonomy may not be as inefficient as it has been argued
to be. By retaining the existing local governmental structure,
the Act preserves, and may in fact increase, 0 2 the freedom which
both the residents of and newcomers to the seven-county area
FORMANCE Or URBAN FUNCTIONS: LOCAL AND ARmAWIDE (1963) [herein-
after cited as URBAN FUNCTioNS].
97. The formation of special districts is, however, subject to objec-
tion, because such districts diffuse local government accountability and
also lack a balanced perspective. See Netzer, supra note 13, at 462-64;
Metropolitan Government, supra note 19, at 135.
98. An area-wide government may not provide all public services
in the most efficient manner, however, as different services have differ-
ent economies of scale. In particular, a metropolitan government may
not be as efficient as a local governmental unit in providing services that
are local in nature, such as fire protection. See URIBAN FuNCTIoNs, supra
note 96, at 9.
The consolidation of the city of Nashville and Davidson County in
Tennessee illustrates this type of alternative. The city-county, however,
was divided into two service districts: a general service district, which
served the entire county, and an urban service district, which served
the area that formerly was Nashville. See Lineberry, Reforming Metro-
politan Governance: Requiem or Reality, 58 GEo. L.J. 675, 698-700
(1970).
99. Toronto has adopted this alternative, whereby the metropolitan
government provides social services, water supply, sewage disposal, mass
transit, regional parks, and complete financing of the educational system
for the entire area. Toronto's six political subdivisions, however, con-
tinue to provide fire protection, garbage and local water and sewage
service, and administration of the local schools. See U.S. ADVISORY
COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IN SEARCH OF BALANCE-
CANADA's INTERGOvERNAMNTAL EXPERIENCE 84-86, app. F (1971) [herein-
after cited as IN SEARCH OF BALANCE].
Other examples of a two-tiered system for providing services include
Winnipeg, Canada, and Miami-Dade County, Florida. See generally IN
SEARCH OF BALANCE, supra at 86-99; Lineberry, supra note 98, at 703-05.
100. These values have been said to be increased opportunity for po-
litical participation and greater knowledge of the local area. See STATE
AID, supra note 19, at 8.
101. Carrington, Financing the American Dream: Equality and
School Taxes, 73 COLm. L. REv. 1227, 1250 (1973).
102. The Act could improve mobility within the seven-county area
by encouraging each municipality to accommodate increased population.
See notes 109-12 infra and accompanying text.
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have had in selecting the municipality that they prefer in rela-
tion to its costs and services. In this way-ignoring economies
of scale-the Act could prove more efficient than a political
structure composed of only one or a few local governmental
units.10 3
Ultimately, of course, the desired balance will probably lie
between the extremes of complete local self-determination and
the realization of the most equitable and efficient tax base for
the provision of an equal level of services over the entire metro-
politan area. The Fiscal Disparities Act resolves this conflict to
a degree by forgoing absolute equality in favor of equal oppor-
tunity: since only resources are equalized, governmental units
retain the discretion to determine the level of public services that
they will provide. The Act's impact on the final balance will
likely be slight and equivocal, however, since it preserves the
present local governmental structure0 " while perhaps improving
the efficiency of local tax bases.
Finally, it should be observed that the discretion left to gov-
ernmental units by the Act cannot lead to a depredation of the
area-wide tax base. The levy that officials of a local governmen-
tal unit choose is apportioned between the local and the area-
wide tax base, with the funds derived from the latter available
only in proportion to the unit's taxation of its own local assessed
valuation. The procedure thus prevents communities from
ravaging the area-wide tax base without enduring a correspond-
ing burden.
B. AREA DEVELOPMENT
The Fiscal Disparities Act is almost certain to have profound
effects upon the development of the seven-county metropolitan
area, at both the local and regional levels. Just what those ef-
fects will be has not yet become clear; certain speculations, how-
ever, are possible.
103. See Netzer, supra note 13, at 460-61. This efficiency is exempli-
fied by the operation of the Tiebout model. By presenting a potential
resident with a number of communities, each offering a varying mix of
services and tax rates, his true preferences will govern his choice of loca-
tion within the metropolitan area, resulting in a more efficient allocation
of services. See Tiebout, supra note 92, at 417, 422.
104. The Twin Cities area is developing the outline of a two-tier sys-
tern of government, with broad policy decisions being made on a regional
level by the Metropolitan Council, and implementation of these policies
being accomplished by local governmental units. See Kolderie, Recon-




At the local level, the Act is likely to affect the location of
future commercial-industrial development. Inasmuch as any
growth in the assessed valuation of commercial-industrial prop-
erty is to be shared in part by the entire area, municipalities
will have less incentive to attract commercial-industrial develop-
ment, and therefore less desire to offer preferential assessments
or to extend public services to areas not otherwise requiring
them. Residential suburbs, in particular, should have little in-
centive to encourage commercial-industrial development, because
under the Act they can share in the assessed valuation of such
property while enduring none of the accompanying congestion
or pollution. 05 Developing communities should also have less
desire for additional commercial-industrial development, since 40
percent of its assessed valuation would be subject to the levies
of other communities. Insofar as the tax revenues to be gen-
erated by the remaining 60 percent of the new property's assessed
valuation-together with the amount received from the area-
wide tax base-exceed the costs of services for the development
and also offset the nuisance of the development to ear, eye, and
lung, commercial and industrial concerns should not be unwel-
come. A fine line exists, therefore, between desirable and un-
desirable developments, especially in view of the uncertainties
inherent in the relationship between tax liabilities and service
costs.'0 6 A municipality's decision may be influenced, however,
by the employment opportunities that a new development might
offer.
In the event that no municipality desires commercial-indus-
trial growth, or if developers become too dissatisfied with the
Act's effect, commercial-industrial development may well locate
outside the borders of the seven-county area. 0 7 The Act could
thus become a cause of urban sprawl. 0 8 For this to occur, how-
ever, the tax advantages of doing business outside the metropoli-
tan area would have to significantly outweigh the added costs-
especially transportation costs. Consequently, the possibility of
105. See Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A
Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REV.
504, 528 (1972).
106. See note 89 supra.
107. Nevertheless, since the area-wide tax rate is in some measure
merely the average of all the tax rates levied in the seven-county area,
its effect is unlikely to be decisive for developers.
108. See Village of Burnsville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523, 539




the Act's becoming a cause of extraregional development seems
remote.
Residential development, too, may be affected by the Fiscal
Disparities Act. Since the distribution of the funds collected
from the area-wide tax base is proportional to a municipality's
population, the Act provides some incentive for a municipality
to encourage population growth. Because the distribution
formula does not take into account the composition of a munic-
ipality's population, however, municipalities will probably still be
unwilling to encourage high-service-cost persons, such as the poor
and the elderly, to locate within their borders.10 9
In can be argued that by equalizing fiscal capacities, the Act
has diminished suburban motives for maintaining exclusionary
zoning practices. 110 Under this theory, low- and middle-income
housing would no longer be a burden on the municipality if the
additional service costs associated with such development could
be satisfied out of funds received from a levy on the area-wide
tax base. Realistically, however, the Act does little to aid de-
velopment of low- and middle-income housing.", Many mu-
nicipalities will still prefer wealthier people as residents, because
they not only significantly raise the residential valuation that a
municipality can retain for itself, but also do not require the
"enabling" public services that the poor and elderly need. Fur-
thermore, cost differentials in the provision of public services
may favor the wealthier communities"12 so that even if expendi-
tures were equalized on a per capita basis, a wealthy community
could still enjoy a greater quantum of public services.
109. See Hagman, Property Tax Reform: Speculations on the Impact
of the Serrano Equalization Principle, 1 REAL EsTATE L.J. 115, 123-24
(1972).
110. See id. at 122; Municipal Services, supra note 19, at 120.
111. Other means, however, are available to encourage low- and
middle-income housing development. For example, the Metropolitan
Council discourages applications for federal aid for any purpose if the
community applicant has not made reasonable efforts to find sites for
federal housing programs. See Kolderie, supra note 104, at 186; Minnea-
polis Tribune, Dec. 9, 1974, § B, at 9, cols. 1-7.
112. The central cities are burdened with greater municipal service
costs than are the suburbs. This condition is usually termed "municipal
overburden." For example, Minneapolis and St. Paul spend two and one-
half times as much per capita for police protection as do suburban
municipalities. This expenditure per capita corresponds closely to the
crime rate. Similar situations exist with respect to fire protection, public
health, housing, park programs, and street maintenance. See E. BRUmT,
THE PLIGHT OF TE Crms 1-15 (Supp. 1973). Thus, merely equalizing
expenditures per capita will not account for the different level of public
services each community requires.
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Local planners may also be affected by the Act, to the extent
that it removes tax base considerations as a factor in urban
planning. Rather than concentrating on whether a particular
land use will generate maximum tax revenues while keeping ser-
vice costs to a minimum, a municipality can base its planning
decisions on nontax factors." 3  On the other hand, the tax
revenue-service cost calculus may simply become more compli-
cated under the Act. Local planners may attempt to weigh the
loss of two-fifths of the incremental growth in a municipality's
commercial-industrial assessed valuation against the implications
of such development under the statutory distribution formula.
In other words, the existence of the Act might simply result in
the incorporation of its effects into the tax revenue-service cost
balance. Nevertheless, to the extent that the Act shifts a munic-
ipality's focus from commercial-industrial development to a
broader range of development by making the latter more eco-
nomically feasible, it should remove tax base considerations as
the primary determinant of that municipality's planning deci-
sions.
On the regional level, the Fiscal Disparities Act should aid
implementation of the Metropolitan Council's Development
Guide" 4 and promote local government cooperation" 5 by re-
ducing intergovernmental competition for commercial and in-
dustrial development. Viewed as part of an overall legislative
scheme, therefore, the Act furthers the orderly growth of the
seven-county area and may make possible the realization of other
regional objectives. If successful, however, the Act may result
in the elimination of one reason for local government reorganiza-
tion," 6 since the problem of fiscal disparities will have been re-
113. Freilich & Ragsdale, Timing and Sequential Controls-The Es-
sential Basis for Effective Regional Planning: An Analysis of the New
Directions for Land Use Control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan
Region, 58 MnN. L. REv. 1009, 1032 (1974).
114. See note 33 supra.
115. See Hagman, supra note 109, at 129-30. The initial response to
the Act, however, has been resistance by most municipalities that must
share their tax base with others. Burnsville's lawsuit challenging the
validity of the Act exemplifies this hostility toward the implementation
of the Act. In addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision uphold-
ing the Act's validity resulted in the introduction in the legislature of
a bill that would repeal the Act. Minneapolis Tribune, Jan. 25, 1975,
§ B, at 10, col. 1. This reaction was foreseen by the house subcommittee
which considered the fiscal disparities bill. See HousE REPoRT, supra
note 8, at 28-29. That subcommittee suggested that the Act be combined
with the Metropolitan Council's proposed percentage equalization pro-
gram, under which all communities would be net beneficiaries.
116. See U.S. ADVISORY Co1n'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIoNs,
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moved or reduced. By so preserving the existing local gov-
ernmental structure, the Act may thus incongruously prove to
be an obstacle to regional government.
The Act may also further, on a more subjective level, the
notion of regionalism in the seven-county area. An enunciated
objective of the Act is "to establish incentives for all parts of
the area to work for the growth of the area as a whole." 1 One
such incentive is provided by the fact that when commercial-
industrial development occurs anywhere in the seven-county
area, many municipalities will share in its contribution to the
area-wide tax base. The Act may thus broaden the focus of local
officials from their own municipalities to the entire seven-county
area.
IV. CONCLUSION
In terms of concrete accomplishment, the Fiscal Disparities
Act is perhaps only a modest step toward improved local govern-
mental finance. It continues the use of the much maligned prop-
erty tax, which has been decried for its regressivity, inequitable
administration, adverse land use consequences, and even un-
popularity." 8 In recent years, however, the property tax has
been looked upon with more favor,1 9 and there now seems little
doubt that it will continue as the mainstay of local finance.120
For this reason, the Act's most significant achievement may be
its redistribution over the seven-county area of possible tax wind-
falls, gained by a particular municipality from the location of
commercial-industrial property within its borders.
Other deficiencies, however, detract from this achievement.
Since the distribution formula is founded primarily on popula-
tion, the shares that governmental units receive from the area-
wide tax base are not necessarily related to the unit's needs.
MERroPoLTAN SocIAL AND EcoN ovEc DIsP~mrEs: IMPLICATIONS FOR IN-
TERGOVERNMENTAL RELATiONS nN CENTRAL CITrS A SuBunns 124-25
(1965).
117. MINN. STAT. § 473F.01 (3) (1974).
118. See generally CiTizENs LxAGUE, supra note 14, at 18-19; FI-
NANCING SCHOOLS, supra note 22, at 11-42, 69-74, 78; Glickstein & Want,
Inequality in School Financing: The Role of Law, 25 STAN. L. REV. 335,
397-98 (1973).
119. See FiNANCING SCHOOLS, supra note 22, at 12; Areen & Ross,
supra note 95, at 49-50; Carrington, supra note 101, at 1244-46.
120. See HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 11; Moon & Moon, The Prop-
erty Tax, Governmental Services, and Equal Protection: A Rational
Analysis, 18 VmL. L. REv. 527, 591-92 (1973) (property taxes should con-
tinue to support public services not producing significant spillovers).
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Moreover, because the shared area-wide tax base is limited in
nature and extent,121 the Act can only partially reduce fiscal dis-
parities. The Act could be revised either to broaden the charac-
ter of property whose assessed valuation is shared,122 or to
supplement its operation with additional funds derived from
a nonproperty tax source at the state or regional level' 23
Increased state aid to municipalities and school districts, for ex-
ample, would lessen the reliance of governmental units on the
property tax1 24 and thus mitigate the deficiencies of the Act. 25
Without modification, however, the Act remains open to attack
as being relatively ineffective in relieving inequities in the tax
burden with respect to the provision of public services.
On other levels, the Fiscal Disparities Act may have a greater
effect. One very important impact may well be that, in conjunc-
tion with the activities of the Metropolitan Council, the Act
will serve to further the orderly development of the seven-county
area. In this regard the Act's narrow focus on commercial-
121. The Act provides that the assessed valuation of only commer-
cial-industrial property will be shared. Moreover, only 40 percent of the
increase in this valuation since 1971 forms the area-wide tax base.
122. Even if the assessed valuation of other property-such as resi-
dential-were included in the redistribution scheme of the Act, merely
requiring the area's tax base to be shared on a larger scale might not
provide sufficient funds for all communities. If a high minimum level
of public services were desired, additional funding would be necessary.
123. See Cimxzs LEAGUE, supra note 14, at 18-23. Of the five fiscal
disparities proposals that were before the house subcommittee, all but
the bill eventually enacted provided for additional revenues. See HousE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 15-29. The house subcommittee felt that, with
or without provision for additional revenues, a statute was needed which
would allow local governmental units to share the property tax base. Id.
at 14.
124. Municipalities in Minnesota are relying less on property taxes
and more on state and federal aid. See Minneapolis Tribune, Jan. 31,
1975, § B, at 2, cols. 3-4 (37 percent of municipalities' revenue generated
by property taxes in 1971; 29 percent in 1973). Nonetheless, property
taxes continue to increase in most municipalities. Id.
125. The present state aid program, however, does little to equalize
taxpayers' burdens. The legislature has concentrated on aiding educa-
tion while doing little to alleviate municipal overburden. E. BRANM,
supra note 112, at 29-37. For example, in 1972 state-provided funds rep-
resented 70 percent of revenue for elementary and secondary schooling,
but only 25 percent of municipal government revenue. Id. at 29. This
pattern of state aid only increases the discrepancies between the fiscal
position of the suburbs, whose primary financial burden is education,
and that of the central cities, which are plagued by greater munic-
ipal costs. See note 112 supra. Minneapolis has been hurt by such a
state aid program. See Minneapolis Tribune, Feb. 12, 1975, § A, at 4,
cols. 1-2. But see Minneapolis Tribune, Feb. 21, 1975, § A, at 12, cols.
1-2 (suburbs' rebuttal).
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industrial property may be appropriate, since such property is
the prime object of municipal competition to improve the local
tax base. Also, the Act may have major significance because
its notion of funding governmental units in part on an area-wide
basis recognizes the seven-county area as a single community.
To this extent the statute may help foster a growing regionalism
in the seven-county area. Conversely, it may serve to rescue
those governmental units faced with a fiscal crisis from the fate
of annexation, merger, or consolidation, and thus encourage the
forces of decentralization.
The impact of the Fiscal Disparities Act will increase in the
future.1 26 For the present, however, its significance seems to rest
in its function as an interim measure, a milestone in the regional
development of the seven-county area.
126. In 1973, the shared commercial-industrial assessed valuation
was to have been only about two percent of the area's total tax base.
By 1985, this figure is expected to be 25 percent. Minneapolis Tribune,




ILLUSTRATION OF THE WORKINGS OF THE
FISCAL DISPARITIES ACT
Consider a metropolitan area in which three municipalities,
A, B, and C, comprise a county, W. For purposes of this illus-
tration, these four entities will be assumed to constitute the only
existing governmental units. A is a central city beset with urban
problems, B is a highly developed inner ring suburb, and C is a
developing outer ring suburb.* The following data is postu-
lated: **
A B C W
Population 1971 50,000 20,000 5,000 75,000
1972 49,000 20,000 6,000 75,000
Valuation***1971 $400 $140 $60 $600
Assessed valuation 1972 $105 $50 $20 $175
C-I assessed vain. 1971 $23.0 $4.9 $3.0
C-I assessed vain. 1972 $23.5 $5.0 $3.5
C-I growth $ .5 $ .1 $ .5
40% C-I growth $ .2 $ .04 $ .2
The effect of the Fiscal Disparities Act on the metropolitan area
can be studied through the use of this data.
1. Calculation of fiscal capacity and area-wide tax base: ****
Fiscal capacity for 1971 (f.c.=valn./pop.) (§473F.02(14))
for A = $400/50,000 = 8,000
for B = $140/20,000 = 7,000
for C = $60/5,000 = 12,000
Average fiscal capacity for 1971 (§473F.02(15))
($400 + $140 + $60)/(50,000 + 20,000 + 5,000) = 8,000
Area-wide tax base (§473.07(l))
$.2 + $.04 + $.2 = $.44
2. Determination of a municipality's distribution from the area-wide tax
base:
* A, B, and C have the approximate fiscal capacities of Minneapolis,
Richfield, and Burnsville, respectively.
** All dollar amounts are in millions. Valn.valuation; pop.=
population; C-I=connmercial-industrial; f.c.-fiscal capacity.
*** Valuation is the market value of real property within a govern-
mental unit.
**** Throughout this statutory process, the burden of calculating the




The area-wide tax base distribution
index (pop.x ((avg. f.c. 1971)/(f.c. 1971)) x 2) (§473F.07(3))
for A = 49,000 X (8,000/8,000) X 2 = 98,000
for B = 20,000 x (8,000/7,000) X 2 = 45,714
for C = 6,000 x (8,000/12,000)X 2 = 8,000
The sum of these indices = 98,000 + 45,714 + 8,000 = 151,714
The area-wide tax base for 1972 (((index)/(indices)) X (area-
wide tax base)) attributable (§473F.07(4), (5))
to A = (98,000/151,714) X $.44 = $.2842
to B = (45,714/151,714) x $.44 = $.1326




A $.2000 $.2842 $.0842
B $.0400 $.1326 $.0926
C $.2000 $.0232 -$.1768
C is a net loser to the area-wide tax base while A and B gain on
balance.
3. Calculation of taxable value for each governmental unit:
((assessed valn.) - (contribution to area-wide tax base) +
(distribution therefrom))
for A for B for C
$105.0000 $50.0000 $20.0000
.2000 - .0400 - .2000




-((.2 + .04 + .2) - .44)








4. Determination of levy:
After the taxable value for their governmental unit has been cal-
culated, officials can decide upon the amount they wish to levy.
Suppose A decides on a levy of $12.6, B $2.25, C $.7, and W $17.5.
These are total levies, which must be apportioned among the local
and area-wide tax bases.
The taxable resources available to each unit (local tax base + area-
wide share)
A = $104.8000 + $.2842 = $105.0842
B = $49.9600 + $.1326 = $50.0926
C = $19.8000 + $.0232 = $19.8232
W = $174.5600 + $.4400 = $175.0000
Unit's area-wide levy (((area-wide share)/(taxable value)) X (total
levy)) (§473F.08(3) (a))
Unit's local levy ((total levy) - (area-wide levy)) (§473F.08(3)(b))
for A area-wide levy = (.2842/105.0842) X 12.6 = $.03408
local levy =12.6 - .03408 = $12.56592
for B area-wide levy = (.1326/50.0926) X 2.25 = $.00596
local levy = 2.25 - .00596 = $2.24404
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for C area-wide levy = (.0232/19.8232) x .7 = $.00082
local levy = .7 - .00082 = $.69918
for W area-wide levy = (.4400/175.0000) X 17.5 = $.04400
local levy = 17.5 - .04400 = $17.45600
5. Calculation of tax rates:
The local tax rate ((unit's local levy)/(unit's local tax base))
(§473F.08(4))
with respect to municipalities
for A = (12.56592)/(104.8000) = .11990 = 119.90 mills
for B = (2.24404)/(49.9600) = .04492 = 44.92 mills
for C = (.69918)/(19.8000) = .03531 = 35.31 mills
with respect to the county
W = (17.45600)/(174.5600) = .10000 = 100.00 mills
The local tax rate is the tax levied on all taxable property except
commercial-industrial property. Thus, for noncommercial-industrial
property, the tax rate is
in A 119.90 + 100.00 = 219.90 mills
in B 44.92 + 100.00 = 144.92 mills
in C 35.31 + 100.00 = 135.31 mills
The area-wide tax rate (§473F.08(5))
The area-wide levy = $.03408 + $.00596 + $.00082 + $.04400 -
$.08486
The area-wide tax rate ((area-wide levy)/ (area-wide tax base))
= (.08486)(.44)
= .19286 = 192.86 mills
The tax rate on commercial-industry property (((40% C-I growth)/
(C-I assessed valn. 1972)) x area-wide tax rate) + (((C-I assessed
valn. 1972-40% C-I growth)/(C-I assessed vain. 1972)) X local tax
rate) (§473F.08(6))
in A=((.2/23.5) x 192.86) + ((23.3/23.5) X 219.90) =219.67 mills
in B=((.04/5) X 192.86) + ((4.96/5) x 144.92) =145.30 mils
in C=((.2/3.5) x 192.86) + ((3.3/3.5) X 135.31)=138.60 mills
Prior to the passage of the Fiscal Disparities Act, tax rates would
have been (unit's tax rate = unit's levy/unit's assessed vain.)
municipal county
in A = (12.6/105) + (17.5/175) = .12000 + .10000 = 220.00 mills
in B = (2.25/50) + (17.5/175) = .04500 + .10000 = 145.00 mills
in C = (.7/20) + (17.5/175) = .03500 + .10000 = 135.00 mills
on both commercial-industrial and other property.
19751

